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YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE 
CONFUSED! UNDERSTANDING 
MIRANDA AFTER 50 YEARS 
 
Bryan Taylor, JD, PhD* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
2016 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Miranda v. 
Arizona.1  Since its issuance, courts have rendered tens of 
thousands of decisions to interpret this amorphous opinion.  
Scholars have published numerous articles in legal academia, 
criminal justice journals, and law enforcement periodicals.  
Millions have heard the familiar Miranda warnings2 whether it 
be from television or movies or being questioned by the police.  
 
* Bryan Taylor is the elected Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County Idaho, 
as well as an adjunct professor of law at Concordia University School of Law.  
The author would like to give special thanks to Margie Cleverdon, a third 
year law student at Concordia University School of Law, and Frank Zebari, a 
deputy prosecutor in Canyon County Idaho, for their contributions, 
suggestions, and thoughts. 
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.”  Id. at 444.  Police often quote the warnings as 
follows: 
 
You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can 
and will be used against you in a court of law.  You have the 
right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you 
while you are being questioned.  If you cannot afford to hire 
a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any 
questioning if you wish.  You can decide at any time to 
exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make 
any statements.  Do you understand each of these rights I 
have explained to you?  Having these rights in mind do you 
wish to talk to us now? 
 
Wainright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 286 (1986).  See Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 375 (2010). 
1
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Today, the Miranda warnings are nearly as deeply engrained 
in American culture as the Star-Spangled Banner is at a 
football game.  The warnings have become second nature, even 
though they do not appear anywhere in the United States 
Constitution.  But although these warnings are well known, 
their meaning and the timing of when police are required to 
provide them can be confusing.  Ultimately with Miranda and 
its progeny “You have the right to be confused!” 
Because so much has been written and discussed about 
Miranda, it is sometimes difficult to see the proverbial forest 
beyond the individual trees.  This article examines where we 
are with Miranda after 50 years from a practice and 
application point of view.3  Due to the complexities that legal 
opinions promulgated in their numerous interpretations, 
Miranda’s changing landscape creates a ripe opportunity for 
law enforcement, legal practitioners, as well as trial judges to 
have a working summation of a case that has significantly 
evolved and changed. 
Part I of this article briefly explores the background and 
historical context that ultimately led to the Miranda decision.  
As the late Dr. Carl Sagan once said, “you have to know the 
past to understand the present.”4  Understanding the 
circumstances and cases leading up to Miranda helps in the 
overall application of Miranda to cases of today.  Part II 
addresses whether a statement should be allowed into evidence 
and provides a practical working approach to conduct a 
Miranda analysis.  This innovative approach provides a step-
by-step process in determining the admissibility of statements 
pursuant to Miranda and its progeny. This process provides 
clarity to the world of Miranda for practitioners in the criminal 
justice system. Finally, Part III of the article examines what 
happens when the Miranda rule is not followed.  The 
ramifications are discussed and distinguished from the Fourth 
 
3. Each one of the sections discussed could easily be its own law review 
article.  The purpose behind this article is to provide a basic foundational 
framework for law enforcement, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges in 
applying Miranda with fifty years of case law. 
4. Cosmos: A Personal Voyage: One Voice in the Cosmic Fugue (PBS 
television broadcast Oct. 5, 1980), http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x10bdyd 
_cosmos-carl-sagan-a-personal-voyage-episode-2_tech. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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Amendment. 
 
II.  PART I: Background and Historical Context of Miranda 
 
By the time the facts of Miranda reached the Supreme 
Court in 1966, the nature and extent of the constitutional 
protections afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendment were 
slowly taking on a more contemporary shape.  Reflecting the 
civil unrest of the period and the increasing pressure for 
greater social equality5, decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court were visibly forging dramatic transformations in the 
criminal justice system.  Even though the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868 as a restriction on state 
power, the Court had consistently resisted interpreting the 
protections of the Bill of Rights as a restraint on the states in 
the exercise of their police power.6  By 1915, the Court had 
ruled the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause applied 
only to federal proceedings7 and the Due Process Clause’s only 
demand on the states with regards to criminal defendants was 
adequate notice of the charges and the opportunity to be 
heard.8  Through numerous legal opinions written during the 
span of the 1930s to the 1960s, the Court gradually paved the 
way for a broader interpretation of the requirements of the Due 
 
5. GARY L. STUART, MIRANDA: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT 22 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 2004). 
6. RICHARD C. CORTNER, A SCOTTSBORO CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND BROWN V. MISSISSIPPI vii (Paul L. Murphy ed., 1986). 
7. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (“[T]he exemption 
from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured 
by any part of the Federal Constitution.”). 
8. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).  As per this court case: 
 
[A] criminal prosecution in the courts of a state, based upon 
a law not in itself repugnant to the Federal Constitution, 
and conducted according to the settled course of judicial 
proceedings as established by the law of the state, so long as 
it includes notice and a hearing, or an opportunity to be 
heard, before a court of competent jurisdiction, according to 
established modes of procedure, is ‘due process’ in the 
constitutional sense. 
 
Id. at 326. 
3
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Process Clause.9  However, a few specific cases effectively 
illustrate the background that ultimately cast the footings for 
the decision pronounced in Miranda v. Arizona. For almost 
three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court had struggled to 
answer fundamental questions regarding police questioning 
suspects and the rights of the accused.  Although numerous 
opinions were promulgated, three opinions capture the general 
basis establishing the foundational framework for the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona. 
 
A. Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 
 
The first case in the trek towards Miranda was the 1936 
United States Supreme Court case of Brown v. Mississippi.10  
On Friday, March 30, 1934, a spring day in the Giles 
Community of Kemper County, Mississippi, the brutally 
bludgeoned and burnt body of Raymond Stewart was 
discovered in the cotton seed room of his home.11  Stewart, a 
sixty-year-old white planter, succumbed to his wounds within 
thirty minutes of his discovery without ever having regained 
consciousness.12  By the following Friday, April 6, an all-white 
 
9. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). The requirement of Due 
Process: 
 
[C]annot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and 
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the 
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of 
depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate 
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony 
known to be perjured. 
 
Id. at 112.  See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932) (“[F]ailure of 
the trial court to give [defendants] reasonable time and opportunity to secure 
counsel was a clear denial of due process.”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 
(1927) (“[A] system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only 
when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in 
the general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can be 
regarded as due process of law . . . .”); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 
(1923) (“[I]t does not seem to us sufficient to allow a Judge of the United 
States to escape the duty of examining the facts for himself when if true as 
alleged they make the trial absolutely void.”). 
10. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
11. CORTNER, supra note 6, at 5, 15. 
12. Id. at 15–16. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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jury delivered verdicts of guilty against three of Stewart’s black 
tenant farmers, Ed Brown, Henry Shields, and Yank 
Ellington.13  The judge sentenced all three to hang on May 11, 
1934.14 
On the evening of the murder, a deputy sheriff and some 
other white men brought Ellington from his home to 
Stewart’s,15 where a mob tied Ellington to a tree and whipped 
him.16  When Ellington denied his involvement in Stewart’s 
murder, the men hung him by his neck from a tree limb.17  
They let him down, but hung him again when he still insisted 
he was not involved.18  Letting him down again, he maintained 
his innocence, so the men tied him to the tree and whipped 
him.19  When he still would not confess, the men told him to go 
home.20  But the ordeal was far from over; two deputies 
arrested Ellington at his home the next day.21  On the way to 
the jail, the deputies drove into nearby Alabama, stopped, and 
“severely whipped” Ellington until he agreed to confess.22 
Meanwhile by Saturday afternoon, Brown and Shields 
were also arrested and taken to the jail.23  On Sunday evening, 
they “were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and 
their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles 
on it” by the deputy sheriff and two other men.24  The 
defendants eventually changed their confessions “in all 
particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of their 
torturers.”25 
The District Attorney, John Stennis, brought the three to 
trial six days after the murder.26  His case against the suspects 
 
13. Id. at 31. 
14. Id. at 10–11. 
15. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281. 
16. CORTNER, supra note 6, at 25. 
17. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281; CORTNER, supra note 6, at 25. 
23. Brown, 297 U.S. at 282. See CORTNER, supra note 6, at 6. 
24. Brown, 297 U.S. at 282. 
25. Id. 
26. Jonathan L. Entin, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in 1 
5
  
2015 THE RIGHT TO BE CONFUSED 163 
was based entirely upon their confessions, all of which were 
obtained via torture.27  After only half an hour, the jury 
returned guilty verdicts and the judge immediately imposed 
death sentences.28  The defendants appealed the verdicts to the 
Mississippi Supreme Court which affirmed the judgments29 
and subsequently, to the United States Supreme Court.30 In a 
significant expansion of the fair-trial rule,31 a unanimous Court 
reversed the state conviction and ruled that a conviction based 
upon a coerced confession offended a fundamental principle of 
justice in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.32  “Coercing the supposed state’s criminals into 
confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them 
against them in trials has been the curse of all countries.”33  
The Brown opinion made it very clear for law enforcement that 
they could not obtain evidence, especially confessions, through 
such physically brutal and coercive methods. 
 
B. Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944) 
 
The second case in the path to Miranda was the 1944 
opinion of Ashcraft v. Tennessee.34  On the morning of June 5, 
1941, Zelma Ashcraft got in her car and set out on a trip to 
 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 224-25 (David S. 
Tanenhaus ed., 2008). 
27. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279.  Called as a rebuttal witness at the trial, 
Deputy Sheriff Cliff Dial admitted that the defendants denied any 
involvement in Stewart’s murder, but that they changed their stories after he 
“kind of warmed them a little–not too much.” CORTNER, supra note 6, at 28.  
When asked if they had been whipped, Dial replied, “[n]ot too much for a 
negro.” Id. 
28. ENTIN, supra note 26, at 224. 
29. Brown, 297 U.S. at 280.  The Mississippi Supreme Court heard the 
Defendant’s motion that the trial court errored that the confessions were 
admissible on the ground that all the evidence against them was obtained by 
coercion.  The defendants also alleged that they had been denied the benefit 
of counsel or opportunity to confer with counsel in a reasonable manner.  The 
court entertained the suggestion of error, and ultimately ruled against the 
defendants contention.  Two judges dissented.  Id. 
30. CORTNER, supra note 6, at chs. 3-4. 
31. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
32. CORTNER, supra note 6, at 131-32. 
33. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). 
34. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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visit her mother in Kentucky from her home in Memphis, 
Tennessee.35  Later that afternoon, her car was seen just 
outside of Memphis, and her murdered body was found just off 
the road in a slough.36  The police questioned her husband E.E. 
Ashcraft later that day about the murder.37  On Saturday June 
14, 1941, the police arrested Ashcraft, brought him to the 
county jail, and placed him in an interrogation room.38  They 
questioned Ashcraft for thirty-six hours straight until the 
morning of Monday, June 16.39  During this entire time, 
Ashcraft was not allowed any rest and received only a five-
minute break.40  What actually transpired in the interrogation 
room was disputed the police claimed that at the end of the 
thirty-six hour interrogation Ashcraft confessed to the crime, 
while Ashcraft claimed he did not.41  Regardless, the police 
relied on what they believed was a confession by Ashcraft: that 
he was overpowered by an individual named John Ware and 
that Ware was the one that actually committed the murder.42  
Once Ware was picked up, the police showed Ware the 
confession by Ashcraft.43  Ware then gave his own statement 
that Ashcraft hired him to kill Ashcraft’s wife.44  Ashcraft 
argued that his confession was coerced because he was 
deprived sleep, food, and a break for such a long period of 
time.45  The U.S. Supreme Court held that even if Ashcraft 
confessed, it was “not voluntary but compelled.”46  “The 
Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the 
conviction of any individual in an American court by means of a 
coerced confession.”47  The Court stated that an individual 
cannot be taken into custody by police officers and held for 
 
35. Id. at 144. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 149. 
39. Id. 
40. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 149. 
41. Id. at 151. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 145. 
46. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 143. 
47. Id. at 155. 
7
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thirty-six hours during which they are kept incommunicado, 
without sleep or rest, being questioned by relays of officers, 
experienced investigators, and highly trained lawyers without 
respite. Such circumstances amount to a denial of due process 
of law and any statements made are not voluntary.48  As a 
result of Aschraft, all forms of coercive techniques are  
prohibited.  Ashcraft distinguishes Brown—in Brown, the 
Court prohibits physical coercion; in Aschraft, the Court 
prohibits forms of coercion that are necessarily “physical” such 
as deprivation of sleep. 
 
C. Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 
 
The third case in the journey to Miranda was the 1964 
case of Escobedo v. Illinois.49  Up to this point in the timeline, 
police knew where the line was drawn as it relates to coercive 
interrogation techniques.  However, they were not given any 
direction as to whether an individual could request an attorney 
to be present on their behalf during an interrogation.  In 
Escobedo, the Court addressed the question of what happens 
when police fail to honor a suspect’s request to consult with his 
lawyer during the course of an interrogation.50  The Court held 
that such a refusal violates the Sixth Amendment; police must 
allow a suspect to speak with an attorney when a suspect asks 
to do so.51 
On the night of January 19, 1960, Danny Escobedo’s 
brother-in-law (Manuel Valtierra) was fatally shot.52  Valtierra 
had escaped prosecution for stabbing his wife (Escobedo’s 
 
48. Id. at 153–54. 
49. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  Escobedo came down one 
year after the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright.  In Gideon, the United 
States Supreme Court held that persons accused of felony offenses have a 
fundamental right to an attorney, even if they cannot afford one, per the 
Sixth Amendment.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Escobedo 
attempted to answer the question as to precisely when in the criminal justice 
process a defendant must be informed of this right to counsel.  Escobedo, 378 
U.S. at 478. 
50. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479. 
51. Id. at 492. 
52. STUART, supra note 5, at 35. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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sister) more than a dozen times the year prior.53  Escobedo, his 
sister, and two friends were arrested the following morning and 
brought in to be questioned.54  Escobedo did not say anything, 
was subsequently released, and retained a lawyer.55  On 
January 30, 1960, Escobedo’s friend, Benedict DiGerlando, was 
again in police custody.56  DiGerlando told police that Escobedo 
was the one that had fired the fatal shots.57  Police arrested 
Escobedo and a detective confronted Escobedo with 
DiGerlando’s statement that Escobedo was the shooter.58  
Escobedo replied, “I am sorry but I would like to have advice 
from my lawyer.”59  The police refused, saying he could talk to 
his lawyer after they were done questioning him.60  Escobedo 
thereafter made an incriminating remark.61  While Escobedo 
was questioned, his attorney had arrived and asked to see his 
client, but the police refused to allow him access to Escobedo.62  
The Supreme Court held when a suspect is in custody and 
requests to speak to an attorney, the police must afford him 
that opportunity.63  To deny such a request is a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.64 
 
D. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
 
 
53. Id. 
54. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479. 
55. Id. 
56. STUART, supra note 5, at 35. 
57. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 481–82. 
61. Id. at 482–83. 
62. Id. at 481–82. 
63. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–92. 
64. Id. at 491.  An additional case prior to Miranda somewhat similar to 
Escobedo is Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  Winston Massiah was 
indicted for narcotics charges, retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty, and was 
released on bail.  While free on bail, a co-defendant (who was working with 
the police) had a conversation with Massiah in the absence of his counsel.   
Police listened in on the conversation and used the incriminating statements 
against him.  The Supreme Court held that under the 6th Amendment 
guaranty of the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel, the defendant’s 
incriminating statements could not be used against him because the 
government had violated that right to counsel. 
9
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Brown, Ashcraft, and Escobedo were three seminal cases 
that capture the tone of the courts in relation to police 
interrogations and set the stage for the 1966 landmark opinion 
of Miranda v. Arizona.65  Up to this point, the Supreme Court 
had employed a case-by-case voluntariness analysis where it 
would review the totality of the circumstances.66  The Court 
was tired of this approach, and with Miranda they ended the 
prominence of due process voluntariness analysis.  One of the 
goals of “the new Miranda rule was to displace the subjective, 
case-by-case due process voluntariness approach with an 
objective standard that applied equally to all cases.”67  The 
Court’s position was that the “due process/totality of 
circumstances/voluntariness test” was “an inadequate barrier 
when custodial interrogation was at stake.”68 Numerous factors 
influenced the Court’s determination to depart from the 
current voluntariness standard. 
 
First, the doctrine required fact-specific, case-by-
case review and thus placed enormous and ever-
growing demands on the federal courts. Second, 
 
65. Although the Miranda opinion is a consortium of cases, because 
Ernesto Miranda’s case appears first in the caption, the case is referred to as 
Miranda v. Arizona.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The other 
three cases are Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and 
California v. Stewart.  Id. 
66. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963); 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-40 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 
U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936). 
67. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 628 (1996).  See Martin R. Gardner, The Emerging Good 
Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule -- A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 461 
(1984); Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical 
Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 781 (1988). 
68. Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. 
L. REV., 965, 967 (2012).  In Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000) the U.S. 
Department of Justice in its reply brief “recall[ed] that the Miranda Court 
arrived at its solution only after concluding that the ‘totality of 
circumstances' voluntariness test, as the sole protection for the Fifth 
Amendment rights of a custodial suspect, had failed....It was inadequate 
because a ‘totality’ test, without more, provided insufficient guidance to the 
police, left inadequate means for this Court to unify and expound the law, 
and resulted in an uncertain legal rule that could not secure the vital 
constitutional rights at stake.” Reply Brief for the United States at 20, 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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the Court had been unable to stimulate sufficient 
lower-court awareness of the voluntariness 
doctrine’s underlying concerns. Despite a century 
of Supreme Court voluntariness jurisprudence, 
lower courts had failed to accept and implement 
creatively the Court’s increasing sensitivity to 
the risks that police practices posed to values 
protected by the federal constitution.69 
 
As a result, the rule promulgated by Miranda would 
change the landscape of custodial interrogations in American 
Criminal Justice. 
The facts of Miranda are one of the most poetically ironic 
stories in criminal justice folklore.  The year was 1963, the day 
March 2.70  Ernesto Miranda, a poor, Mexican immigrant, lived 
in Phoenix, Arizona.71  On this day, Miranda kidnapped an 
eighteen year-old woman from a movie theatre, blindfolded her, 
took her out into the Arizona desert, and raped her.72  
Following the rape, Miranda drove her back to town and 
dropped her off in the neighborhood where she lived.73  While 
the rape took place, witnesses obtained a partial plate number 
of the truck.74  Even though the victim reported the crime, the 
police did not have much to work from.75  However, soon after, 
a witness spotted a truck matching the description along with 
 
69. George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 
1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 235 (1988).  see also Stephen 
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435 (1987). 
70. STUART, supra note 5, at 4. 
71. Id. 
72. Michael S. Lief & H. Mitchell Caldwell, You Have the Right to 
Remain Silent, AM. HERITAGE MAGAZINE, Aug./Sept. 2006, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090206174116/http://americanheritage.com/arti
cles/magazine/ah/2006/4/2006_4_48.shtml. 
73. Id.  See STUART, supra note 5, at 4. 
74. STUART, supra note 5, at 5 (disputing as to who obtained the partial 
plate number; the victim’s cousin or the victim’s brother-in-law). 
75. Id. at 3–5.  A young detective by the name of Carroll Cooley took on 
the case as the latest one in a series of similar incidents, which over the 
previous few months.  Id. at 4.  The first occurred on November 27, 1962, in 
which the suspect assaulted, robbed, and attempted to rape a young bank 
teller.  Id. at 3.  The second occurred on February 22, 1963, in which the 
suspect attempted to rape and rob an eighteen-year-old telephone dispatcher.  
Id. 
11
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the partial license plate.76  Police followed up on the lead and 
identified the vehicle as belonging to Twila Hoffman.77  
Hoffman told detectives that the man living with her was 
Ernesto Miranda and he used the car.78  Shortly after, Miranda 
agreed to accompany police to the station for 
questioning.79During the interrogation, Miranda did not have 
an attorney present.80  The police officers questioning him did 
not inform him of his right against self-incrimination, nor of his 
right to counsel.81  Miranda had not finished the ninth grade 
and had a history of mental instability.82  After two hours, 
Miranda gave a full confession in writing.83  The police then 
took Miranda to the victim where he further positively 
identified she was the girl he kidnapped and raped.84 
Other than Miranda’s confession, prosecutors had little 
evidence to present at trial. Relying on only the confession, a 
jury convicted Miranda. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 
twenty to thirty years in prison.85 Miranda appealed, arguing 
he should have been advised of his right to an attorney and of 
his right to remain silent prior to police questioning.86 
Miranda’s appeal proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court.  In 
1966, the Court set forth what would come to be known as 
Miranda warnings and mandated that law enforcement officers 
advise suspects of their constitutional rights (despite the 
Constitution itself does not requiring such action).  The 
Supreme Court summarized as follows: 
 
Our holding will be spelled out with some 
specificity in the pages which follow but briefly 
stated it is this: the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
 
76. Id. at 5. 
77. STUART, supra note 5, at 5. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966). 
81. Id. 
82. STUART, supra note 5, at 7, 9. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 15–22. 
86. Id. at 22. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  By custodial 
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way.  As for 
the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless 
other fully effective means are devised to inform 
accused persons of their right of silence and to 
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, 
the following measures are required.  Prior to 
any questioning, the person must be warned that 
he has a right to remain silent, that any 
statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.  The defendant may waive 
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver 
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at 
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult 
with an attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioning.  Likewise, if the individual is alone 
and indicates in any manner that he does not 
wish to be interrogated, the police may not 
question him.87 
 
The Court rooted its rationale in the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against self-incrimination, as opposed to the right to 
counsel.88  The Court reasoned that when a suspect is being 
 
87. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45 (footnote omitted). 
88. Although the Miranda warnings are rooted in the Fifth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has declared in a number of cases that the warnings 
established are a “series of recommended ‘procedural safeguards’ . . . [that] 
were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead 
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was 
protected.”  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1974)); See Connecticut v. Barrett, 
479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (holding that the warnings prescribed by Miranda 
13
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interrogated in a police-dominated atmosphere, they are likely 
to be prompted to make an incriminating confession. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided Miranda’s 
confession was obtained improperly and, therefore, set 
Miranda’s conviction aside.89  The police failed to first inform 
Miranda of his right to an attorney and his right against self-
incrimination.  On remand, the State of Arizona retried 
Miranda, without using his confession.  Rather, they used 
testimony from Miranda’s estranged wife, whom Ernesto 
confided in about what had transpired and had confessed that 
he was guilty of the crime.90 
However, the poetic tale of Ernesto Miranda does not end 
after his second trial.  Miranda was paroled in 1972.  After his 
release, Miranda earned a supplemental income autographing 
“Miranda Warning” cards for $1.50 apiece.91  Miranda decided 
to earn a little more money by playing in a poker game at a 
Phoenix bar.  On January 31, 1976, Miranda was playing cards 
in a bar called La Amapola.92  One of the other players caught 
Miranda cheating, confronted him, and ultimately stabbed and 
killed him.93  Police arrived on scene and started to question 
potential suspects.  The urban legend94 told is that police 
questioned the suspected killer, yet failed to Mirandize him, 
and thus, the killer’s statements could never be used to 
prosecute him. 
 
are not “required by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced 
confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic 
purpose.”). 
89. Miranda, 384 at 492. 
90. Larry A. Van Meter, Miranda After Miranda, in GREAT SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS (Chelsea House Publishers, 2007) 
http://www.fofweb.com/History/MainPrintPage.asp?iPin=GSCDMA07&DataT
ype=AmericanHistory. 
91. Jack Kelly, The Miranda Decision, 40 Years Later, AM. HERITAGE 
(June 13, 2006, 8:40 AM), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080704141306/http://www.americanheritage.co
m/events/articles/web/20060613-ernesto-miranda-rights-supreme-court-fifth-
amendment-arizona-constitution-scottsboro.shtml. 
92. Van Meter, supra note 85. 
93. Miranda Stabbing Suspect Caught, KINGMAN DAILY MINER, Feb. 2, 
1976, at 2, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=cjIPAAAAIBAJ&pg=6150,1736687. 
94. These facts are not substantiated, but are tales told amongst 
prosecutors and law enforcement professionals. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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For fifty years, the Miranda case has evolved in its 
understanding and its application.  Those involved in the 
criminal justice system have struggled with proper 
implementation of Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion in 
Miranda.  The remainder of this article provides a summation 
of the Supreme Court rulings interpreting and explaining 
Miranda.  The article provides a functional approach for 
practitioners and law enforcement to navigate Miranda and its 
progeny 50 years later.95 
 
III. Part II: Two Prong Approach to Miranda 
 
Miranda v. Arizona is the foundational opinion that sets 
base-line rules governing confessions both in the federal as well 
as state courts.  The general rule prescribed by Miranda is that 
when a suspect is in custody being interrogated by police, he 
must be provided Miranda warnings for any subsequent 
confession to be admissible.  After those warnings are given, it 
must then be determined whether the suspect voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently agreed to speak with law 
enforcement.  With over fifty years of precedent analyzing 
Miranda, a process slowly emerged from the numerous legal 
opinions.  The following flow chart provides a six-step process 
to analyze whether a confession has been obtained in 
compliance with Miranda and its progeny.  The chart further 
provides a pragmatic guide for practitioners, both in the legal 
and law enforcement communities. 
There are two prongs to the Miranda analysis.96  The first 
prong is whether the warnings need to be given.  Step One is 
the most complex in determining whether three factors are 
 
95. Two years after the Supreme Court decided Miranda, Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which, in essence, made the admissibility of 
confessions dependent solely on whether they were made voluntarily.  
However, the Supreme Court, almost forty years later in Dickerson v. United 
States, stated that because Miranda was based upon interpretation of the 
Constitution, Congress could not impose different standards and rules 
making non-Mirandized confessions admissible.  Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
96. Although not expressly established in any particular case, a 
confession will typically be allowed in a criminal prosecution upon a 
successful showing of these two prongs. 
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present for Miranda to apply.  All three factors must be met 
before one can move on to Step Two.  The second step identifies 
certain exceptions where even though the three factors exist in 
Step One, Miranda warnings are not required.  Step Three 
requires a suspect be advised of the four warnings as 
prescribed. 
The second prong is as follows: if the warnings are 
required to be given, has the suspect either effectively invoked 
his rights or has the suspect waived them.  Step Four 
addresses whether at any time the suspect clearly and 
unequivocally invoked his rights.  Steps Five and Six address 
whether a suspect’s waiver was voluntarily, intelligently, and 
knowingly made.  If the police follow all six steps properly, any 
statements made should be proper under the Miranda doctrine.  
Figure 197 is a flow chart of the proper application of Miranda. 
 
97. This flow chart was created in 2013 by Dr. Bryan Taylor to aid in the 
training of law enforcement officers.  This particular version has been slightly 
modified for publication purposes.  Further the chart has served as a tool for 
practitioners to apply Miranda as articulated by the Supreme Court over the 
past 50 years.  The tool has been tested in state court with much success. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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Figure 1:  Miranda Flow Chart 
 
   
Prong #1: Does Miranda Apply? Prong #2: Has suspect invoked or waived rights? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step#1: General Rule 
Do ALL "3" factors apply? 
i.  Authority 
ii. Custody 
iii. Questioning/Interrogation 
“No” 
“Yes” 
Miranda 
Doesn't Apply 
Move to 
Step #2 
Step #2: Exceptions 
Does an Exception apply? 
i.  Routine traffic stop 
ii. Public safety 
iv. Officer safety/Terry stops 
v.  Routine booking questions 
“Yes” 
“No” 
Miranda 
Doesn't Apply 
Move to Step #3 
Step #3: Warnings 
Was suspect advised of "4" warnings? 
i.   Right to remain silent. 
ii.  Anything said can and will be used. 
iii. Right to an attorney. 
iv. Can't afford attorney, one provided. 
“Yes” “No” 
Statements 
Suppressed 
Move to 
Prong #2  
Step#4: Invocation of Rights 
At any time did the suspect clearly and 
unequivocally invoke his/her rights? 
i.  Right to remain silent. 
ii. Right to an attorney. 
“Yes” "No" 
Move to 
Step #5 
Stop Questioning! 
Step #5: Voluntary 
Did suspect voluntarily agree to 
speak with you? 
i. Any coercion 
“Yes” 
Move to Step #6 Inquire as to why? 
“No” 
Step #6: Knowingly & Intelligently 
Did suspect  knowingly & intelligently 
understand the warnings? 
i.  Is the individual intoxicated 
ii. How old is the individual 
Proceed with 
questioning 
Clarify as what they 
do not understand 
“Yes
” 
“No” 
Has there been a 
14 day break? 
“Yes” “No” 
Back to 
Step #1 
Don’t 
Question 
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A.  First Prong: Does Miranda Apply? 
 
 1.  Step One: General Rule and Three Factors 
 
Three basic requirements have to be met before the 
Miranda doctrine is applicable and the warnings required to be 
given.  If one of these requirements is absent, then the rules set 
forth in Miranda do not apply. The three requirements are: (1) 
authority, (2) custody, and (3) interrogation.  If all three 
requirements are met, then the law enforcement officer must 
advise the suspect of the four warnings as prescribed; that is 
unless there is an exception as discussed in Step Two. 
 
  a.  Authority 
 
The first requirement of Miranda is that police or other 
law enforcement officials are required to be the primary actors.  
If a private citizen, a corporate employer, or a non-law 
enforcement governmental entity questions a suspect about a 
crime, Miranda does not apply.  For example, if a manager of a 
business brings an employee into an interview room, questions 
the employee about stealing from the company, and obtains a 
confession, the manager is not obligated to provide any 
warnings. 
Typically, under Miranda and its progeny, the term 
“authority” has been limited to the police.98  However, other 
categories of law enforcement officials can also fall under this 
category, such as prosecutors and probation officers.  Despite 
this, case law addressing these groups is minimal compared to 
that dealing with police. Miranda does not apply to all 
government actors.  The primary focus of Miranda is to protect 
the individual from those governmental actors that have the 
power to deprive an individual of constitutional liberties 
through unlawful coercion.  When an individual comes into 
contact with law enforcement in their official capacity, a 
psychological factor is created.  “[T]he ‘principal psychological 
factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy—
 
98. Meg Penrose, Miranda, Please Report to the Principal’s Office, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 775, 777 (2006). 
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being alone with the person under interrogation.’”99  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that even in the absence of 
physical coercion, a police officer’s dominance100 in a setting of 
custodial interrogation creates grave risks.  Such a setting 
hinders a suspect’s ability to refuse to answer questions. 
Coercion is determined from the perspective of the 
suspect.101  In Illinois v. Perkins, the court discussed what 
constitutes a coercive atmosphere.102  In that case, a murder 
investigation led police to suspect Lloyd Perkins as the killer.103  
At the time of the investigation, Perkins was being 
incarcerated at a local jail for an unrelated offense.104  Police 
placed an undercover agent (Parisi) in a jail cellblock with 
Perkins where Parisi then struck up a conversation with 
Perkins and asked if he had ever killed anyone.105  Perkins 
made statements that implicated himself in the murder and 
those statements were used to aid in convicting Perkins.106  The 
Supreme Court held that “the essential ingredients of a ‘police-
dominated atmosphere’ and compulsion are not present when 
an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he 
believes to be a fellow inmate.”107  Thus, when a suspect does 
not perceive that he is speaking with law enforcement, the 
concerns of Miranda are alleviated. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never issued an opinion 
specifically addressing whether Miranda’s rules, regarding 
interrogation by a governmental actor, apply in a school 
 
99. Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966). 
100. Id. at 451. 
101. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990); Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
102. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296.  In Perkins, Richard Stephenson was 
murdered.  Id. at 294.  An investigation led police to suspect Lloyd Perkins as 
the killer. Id. at 294.  Because Perkins was incarcerated at a local jail for an 
unrelated offense, the police placed an undercover agent (Parisi) in the same 
cellblock with Perkins.  Id. at 294-95.  Parisi made contact with Perkins and 
inquired if Perkins had ever killed anyone.  Id. at 295. Perkins made 
statements that implicated him in the murder and those statements were 
later used against him.  Id. at 295. 
103. Id. at 294. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 294-95. 
106. Id. at 295. 
107. Id. at 296. 
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setting.108  However, when a principal (or other school actor) 
requires a student to come to her office to question them about 
a potential crime, Miranda does not apply.  As long as the 
principal is acting alone and is not being directed by the police, 
then she is not an “authority” for purposes of Miranda.  In New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.,109 the Supreme Court decided that school 
officials acting in furtherance of their educational 
responsibilities have greater latitude under the Fourth 
Amendment than law enforcement officers do to search 
students and their property.110 
 
108. Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the 
Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 41 (2006). 
109. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985). 
110. Id.  The Court “did not consider the level of suspicion necessary 
when school officials act ‘in conjunction with or at the behest of law 
enforcement agencies’ because the school administrator acted alone in 
searching [the defendant’s] belongings.” Michael Pinard, From the Classroom 
to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public 
School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1067, 1080–81 (2003).  See Holland, supra note 103, at 41 (proceeding to 
quote an Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court that held that 
a student’s answer to a principal’s questions were admissible despite the 
absence of Miranda warnings).  The Court held: 
 
We have no doubt, however, that the T.L.O. standards 
concerning Fourth Amendment searches are equally 
applicable to defendant’s Fifth Amendment claim.  A school 
official must have leeway to question students regarding 
activities that constitute either a violation of the law or a 
violation of school rules.  This latitude is necessary to 
maintain discipline, to determine whether a student should 
be excluded from the school, and to decide whether further 
protection is needed for the student being questioned or for 
others.  A principal acting completely independently of any 
law enforcement agency, such as the one in the case quoted 
above, cannot possibly convey the sort of compulsion 
equivalent to that associated with arrest.  Thus, there is no 
need for Miranda’s protections.  Accordingly, 
straightforward Miranda analysis would exempt such 
questioning from the rules applicable to custodial 
interrogation.  The question of custody need not even be 
raised because the principal lacks the power that raises 
Miranda concerns. The T.L.O. opinion--which does not 
address interrogation or the Fifth Amendment privilege--
simply does not make a meaningful contribution to this 
straightforward Miranda analysis.  The error highlighted 
here, harmless in this context, becomes consequential when 
judges seek to extend T.L.O.’s “standards” to questioning 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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  b.  Custody 
 
The second requirement for Miranda to apply is that a 
suspect must be in “custody.”  Only when a suspect is taken 
into custody are the Miranda warnings triggered.  Under 
Miranda, custody is viewed in light of the Fifth Amendment.  
Under a Fourth Amendment analysis there are three types of 
contacts between law enforcement and private citizens: (1) 
consensual encounter,111 (2) stop/investigative detention (a 
seizure justified by reasonable suspicion),112 and (3) actual 
arrest or “custody” (a seizure justified by probable cause).113  
The Fifth Amendment does not concern itself with the first two 
types of contacts.  For example, if a police officer pulls over a 
vehicle for speeding, approaches the driver, and asks how fast 
he was driving, the individual would be “seized” (or “detained”) 
under a Fourth Amendment analysis.114  However, the same 
individual would not be “in custody” for Fifth Amendment 
purposes.  As a result,  Miranda would not be triggered by this 
seizure. 
The Supreme Court in Howes v. Fields115 provides 
guidance as to what “custody” means for the purposes of 
Miranda: 
 
 
As used in our Miranda case law, “custody” is a 
term of art that specifies circumstances that are 
 
conducted by or in the presence of law enforcement officers, 
i.e., individuals with the power to arrest and whose actions 
carry a threat of compulsion no principal acting alone can 
ever convey. 
 
Holland, supra note 103, at 59–60. 
111. See Flordia v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); U.S. v. Drayton, 536 
U.S. 194 (2002); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). 
112. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); U.S. v. 
Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968);  Kaupp v. 
Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003). 
113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
114. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
115. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012). 
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thought generally to present a serious danger of 
coercion.  In determining whether a person is in 
custody in this sense, the initial step is to 
ascertain whether, in light of “the objective 
circumstances of the interrogation,” a 
“reasonable person [would] have felt he or she 
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation 
and leave.”  And in order to determine how a 
suspect would have “gauge[d]” his “freedom of 
movement,” courts must examine “all of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”  
Relevant factors include the location of the 
questioning. 
 
Determining whether an individual’s freedom of 
movement was curtailed, however, is simply the 
first step in the analysis, not the last.  Not all 
restraints on freedom of movement amount to 
custody for purposes of Miranda.  We have 
“decline[d] to accord talismanic power” to the 
freedom-of-movement inquiry, and have instead 
asked the additional question whether the 
relevant environment presents the same 
inherently coercive pressures as the type of 
station house questioning at issue in Miranda.  
“Our cases make clear . . . that the freedom-of-
movement test identifies only a necessary and 
not a sufficient condition for Miranda 
custody.”116 
 
Thus, the test of whether a suspect is in custody is 
analyzed using the objective reasonable suspect test. 
 
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the 
determination: first, what were the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; 
and second, given those circumstances, would a 
reasonable person have felt he or she was at 
 
116. Id. at 1189–90. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.  
Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and 
actions are reconstructed, the court must apply 
an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: 
“[was] there a ‘formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated 
with formal arrest.” 117 
 
Ultimately, the determining factor of whether a suspect is 
in custody for the purposes of receiving Miranda protections is 
whether there is a formal arrest or “restraint on freedom of 
movement” to the degree associated with a formal arrest.118 
All circumstances surrounding the situation should be 
examined, including how a reasonable person in the suspect’s 
position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.119  The 
subjective views of both the interrogating officers and those of 
the person being questioned are irrelevant.120  The test involves 
no consideration of the “actual mindset” of the particular 
suspect being questioned by the police.121  Five factors are often 
 
117. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).  See J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 662–63 (2004); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994); 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 n.35 (1984). 
118. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citing Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 
119. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2397 (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322,325). 
120. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323. 
121. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667; see also Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 
n.3.  For example in Illinois v. Perkins, the government placed an undercover 
agent in the cell of Perkins. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).  At 
the time, Perkins was incarcerated on charges unrelated to the subject of the 
government’s investigation (a murder).  Id. at 294.  While the agent 
masqueraded as Perkins cellmate, Perkins made statements to the agent 
describing at length the details of the murder.  Id. at 295.  The Supreme 
Court ruled in this particular situation, a reasonable suspect would not 
believe they were in custody.  Id. at 300.  “Miranda was not meant to protect 
suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons 
whom they believe to be their cellmates.”  Id. at 298.  Because Perkins was 
not in custody, one of the requirements was not met and, thus, Miranda was 
not applicable.  Id. at 300.  However, even though the use of undercover 
agents may not be violative of Miranda, such situations can create a violation 
of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the defendant has been 
already been charged. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
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considered to determine whether or not a suspect is free to 
leave: (1) whether the officers told the suspect he was under 
arrest or free to leave; (2) the location or physical surroundings 
of the interrogation;122 (3) the length of the interrogation; (4) 
 
122. The location of the interrogation plays an important role in 
determining custody for the purposes of Miranda.  The objective reasonable 
suspect test, regarding whether a suspect believes they are free to leave, is 
also employed when examining the location of the interrogation.  The 
majority of opinions discuss three primary locations: (1) police stations; (2) 
residential encounters; and (3) encounters on the street.  Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298, 300–01 (1985) (suspect’s residence); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442–
43 (street encounter); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493-94 (police station).  
Hospitals, schools, and places of employment are other common locations, 
however, there are no U.S. Supreme Court cases relating to these settings.  
See WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 CRIM. PROC. § 6.6(e) (3d 
ed. Supp. 2014). 
Police station interrogations and arrests. When a suspect is taken to a police 
station, he or she is likely “in custody” for Miranda purposes.  See Howes v. 
Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189–90 (2012).  When a suspect has been advised 
that he or she is under arrest and is escorted to the police station, the suspect 
is clearly in custody.  An objective reasonable person would not believe they 
were free to leave.  From the moment the police place that individual under 
arrest, they are in custody for the purposes of Miranda.  This means if a 
suspect is arrested and placed in handcuffs at the crime scene, they are in 
custody from that point forward.  When a suspect is placed in the back of a 
patrol car to be taken down to the police station (even if not necessarily under 
arrest), more likely than not, such individual is in custody for the purposes of 
Miranda. 
There is a distinction, however, when a suspect voluntarily comes to the 
police station on their own accord in response to a police request.  In such 
situations, the suspect is typically not in custody for Miranda purposes.  
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977).  In that case, Carl 
Mathiason was called to the police station to be questioned about a burglary.  
Id. at 493.  Mathiason and an officer met in the hallway, shook hands, and 
went into an office.  Id.  The officer advised Mathiason that he was not under 
arrest and that the officer desired to talk with him about a burglary.  Id.  
Mathiason sat there for a few minutes and ultimately confessed to the crime.  
Id.  The officer never advised Mathiason of his Miranda rights prior to the 
confession.  Id. at 494.  The Supreme Court held that Mathiason was not in 
custody because he was not “deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.”  Id. at 495. 
In Howes, the Supreme Court held that simply because someone is in prison 
or jail does not automatically mean they are “in custody” for the purposes of 
Miranda.  Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1188-89.  There, Randall Fields (the suspect), 
was serving a sentence in a Michigan jail.  Id. at 1185.  A jailer escorted 
Fields to a conference room where two sheriff’s deputies questioned him 
regarding allegations he engaged in sexual conduct with a twelve-year-old 
boy (prior to his incarceration).  Id.  In order for Fields to get to the 
conference room, he had to traverse down one floor and pass through a locked 
door.  Id. at 1186.  At the beginning of the interview, the deputies advised 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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whether the officers used coercive tactics such as a hostile 
manner of speech, the display of weapons, or physical restraint 
of the suspect’s movement; and (5) whether the suspect 
voluntarily submitted to questioning.123 
 
  c.  Interrogation 
 
The third requirement for Miranda is that there be 
interrogation—defined as questioning of a suspect that is likely 
to illicit an incriminating response.124  Stated differently, 
 
Fields he was free to leave and return to his cell.  Id.  Fields remained free of 
handcuffs throughout the duration of the interview, which lasted five to 
seven hours.  Id.  About half-way through, officers confronted Fields about 
the allegations of abuse.  Id.  Fields eventually confessed to engaging in 
sexual acts with the boy.  Id.  The Court indicated that “Miranda adopted a 
‘set of prophylactic measures’ designed to ward off “the ‘inherently compelling 
pressures’ of custodial interrogation,” but Miranda did not hold that such 
pressures are always present when a prisoner is taken aside and questioned 
about events outside the prison walls.”  Id. at 1188. 
Encounters at one’s residence. When an encounter takes place at a suspect’s 
home, they are probably not in custody, unless they have been placed under 
arrest.  Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
Street Encounters. Another common location where law enforcement and 
suspects interact is on the street.  The general rule is that the police can 
engage in questioning of persons near the scene of a crime without giving 
Miranda warnings.  During these encounters, there are times in which the 
police decide to detain a person, not for the specific known crime, but rather, 
because they are acting suspiciously.  When an officer does this, typically the 
person is not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). 
123. United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 138 (3d Cir. 2010). 
124. An incriminating response as defined by the Court is “any 
response—whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that the prosecution may 
seek to introduce at trial.”  Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 
(1980).  As the Court observed in Miranda: 
 
No distinction can be drawn between statements which are 
direct confessions and statements which amount to 
‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense.  The privilege 
against self-incrimination protects the individual from being 
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not 
distinguish degrees of incrimination.  Similarly, for 
precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn 
between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to 
be merely ‘exculpatory’.  If a statement made were in fact 
truly exculpatory, it would, of course, never be used by the 
prosecution.  In fact, statements merely intended to be 
25
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Miranda applies only when a confession results from 
questioning or conduct intended to elicit an incriminating 
response.  For example, if an officer arrests an individual for 
selling methamphetamine and, while driving the suspect to the 
police station, engages in a conversation about the Boise State 
Broncos, the suspect is not being interrogated.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified this standard in Rhode Island v. Innis: 
 
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play 
whenever a person in custody is subjected to 
either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent.  That is to say, the term 
“interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to 
express questioning, but also to any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those 
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that 
the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.  
The latter portion of this definition focuses 
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, 
rather than the intent of the police.125 
 
As with the custody requirement, the test is an objective 
inquiry that does not consider the officer’s intent or the 
individual suspect’s understanding.  The questioning must be 
designed to elicit an incriminating response.  This means that a 
volunteered statement would not be covered by Miranda.  If a 
suspect spontaneously makes an incriminating statement 
without prompting, such statement is admissible per 
Miranda.126  A voluntary statement may be used regardless of 
 
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his 
testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the 
statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt 
by implication.  These statements are incriminating in any 
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without 
the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other 
statement. 
 
Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966)). 
125. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. 
126. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).  In Connelly, Francis 
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whether the suspect is in custody or not in custody. 
Interrogation for the purposes of Miranda includes not just 
direct questioning but also indirect questioning.  If an officer 
says specific words or performs some actions that an officer 
“should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect,” then it would be deemed 
“interrogation.”127  The test is whether an objectively 
reasonable person would believe that the actions (or words) 
indirectly conveyed are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
An interrogation must be conducted by police or an agent 
 
Connelly randomly approached a Denver police officer and stated that he had 
murdered someone and he wanted to talk about it.  Id. at 160.  The officer 
Mirandized him and Connelly subsequently told the officer that the “voice of 
God” told him to confess to the murder.  Id. at 160-61.  The Court held this 
was a voluntary and non-coerced answer and the statements came in.  Id. at 
167. 
127. In Innis, the defendant Thomas Innis robbed a taxicab driver with 
a sawed-off shotgun. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293.  The driver contacted officers and 
identified a picture of Innis.  Id.   When the police subsequently arrested 
Innis he did not have the shotgun on his person. Id. at 294.  Officers read him 
his rights and Innis stated he wanted an attorney.  Id.  Three officers placed 
him in the back of their patrol car and began driving him to the police 
station.  Id.  While en route, two officers conversed among themselves about 
the missing shotgun.  Id.  One of the officers stated that there were “a lot of 
handicapped children running around in this area” because a school for such 
children was located nearby, and “God forbid one of them might find a 
weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.”  Id. at 294-95.  Innis 
interrupted the conversation telling the officers that they should turn around 
and that he could show them where the gun was located.  Id. at 295.  The 
Supreme Court held: 
 
Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to have 
consisted of no more than a few off hand remarks, we cannot 
say that the officers should have known that it was 
reasonably likely that Innis would so respond.  This is not a 
case where the police carried on a lengthy harangue in the 
presence of the suspect.  Nor does the record support the 
respondent’s contention that, under the circumstances, the 
officers’ comments were particularly “evocative.”  It is our 
view, therefore, that the respondent was not subjected by 
the police to words or actions that the police should have 
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from him. 
 
Id. at 303. 
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of the police.128  If police intentionally set up a compromising 
situation for the purpose of inducing a suspect to incriminate 
themselves, then it is likely that an “interrogation” will have 
taken place.129  However, when police allow a situation to 
develop that is likely to prompt a suspect to provide an 
incriminating statement, typically Miranda does not apply. 
In Arizona v. Mauro,130 William Mauro was in police 
custody being investigated for the murder of his son.  Mauro 
was provided Miranda warnings and conveyed to police that he 
did not want to answer any questions until a lawyer was 
present.131  All questioning stopped, detectives left the room, 
and Mauro’s wife, who was being questioned in another room, 
asked if she could speak to her husband.132  The Detectives 
agreed and allowed her to talk with Mauro in a room with an 
 
128. When questions are asked by people other than the police, Miranda 
does not apply, unless the questions are asked under the direction of police.  
For example, if a private investigator, or the victim of a crime, asks a suspect 
questions and the suspect provides incriminating statements, they can be 
used against that suspect, despite a lack of Miranda warnings. 
129. In Missouri v. Seibert, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
“question-first” interrogation technique by law enforcement.  Missouri v. 
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).  Patrice Seibert’s twelve-year-old son, Jonathan, 
had cerebral palsy.  Id. at 604.  When he died in his sleep, Seibert was fearful 
that charges would be brought against her for neglect.  Id. at 604.   Seibert, 
with the assistance of her two teenage sons, devised a plan to incinerate the 
body of Jonathan by burning their mobile home.  Id. at 604. They asked 
Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager who was living with the family, to 
remain at the home with Jonathan, without telling Donald that Jonathan 
was dead. Id. at 604. Seibert’s son and a friend set the home afire, ultimately 
killing Donald.  Id. at 604.  When police ultimately arrested Seibert, they 
brought her into an interrogation room. Id. at 604. Officer Hanrahan 
refrained from giving Miranda warnings and questioned Seibert for thirty to 
forty minutes.  Id. at 605. Seibert ultimately confessed to the crime.  Id. at 
605.  After she confessed, Officer Hanrahan turned on a tape recorder, 
provided Seibert Miranda warnings, and obtained a signed waiver of her 
rights. Id. at 605. Seibert thereafter provided a full confession on tape.  Id. at 
605.  In short, law enforcement intentionally started the interrogation 
without first reading Miranda warnings, and thereafter, obtained a 
confession.  Id. at 605-06. Then, knowing the story, officers went back, read 
the warnings, and had the suspect repeat the same story.  Id. at 606.  The 
Court held that this “question-first” tactic effectively threatens to thwart 
Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be 
admitted, and thus, is not permitted. Id. at 617. 
130. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987). 
131. Id. at 522. 
132. Id. 
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officer present and the conversation being tape-recorded.133 In 
conversing with his wife, Mauro made incriminating 
statements.134  The Supreme Court held this did not constitute 
interrogation because Mauro’s wife was not acting at the 
direction of the police.135  The police did not utilize any coercive 
design to extract a confession in this particular circumstance. 
 
 2.  Step Two:  Exceptions 
 
If one of the three factors (authority, custody, and 
interrogation) is not met, then the rules promulgated in 
Miranda do not apply and the only potential issue surrounding 
the confession is whether it was voluntarily given.  If all three 
factors do exist, the next step in the analysis is whether one of 
the “exceptions” apply in which the Miranda warnings do not 
need to be given.  Case law suggests four exceptions: (1) routine 
traffic stops, (2) public safety, (3) officer safety/routine Terry 
stops, and (4) routine booking questions and questions of 
identification. 
 
  a.  Routine Traffic Stops 
 
The roadside questioning of a motorist who has been 
detained as a result of a routine traffic stop does not constitute 
“custodial interrogation” for the purposes of Miranda.136  
Although an ordinary traffic stop curtails the “freedom of 
action” of the detained motorist and imposes some pressures on 
the detainee to answer questions, such pressures do not 
sufficiently impair the detainee’s exercise of his privilege 
against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his 
constitutional rights.  A traffic stop is usually brief and the 
motorist expects that, while he may be given a citation, in the 
end he will most likely be allowed to continue on his way.  
Moreover, the typical traffic stop is conducted in public, and 
the atmosphere surrounding it is substantially less “police 
 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 522-23. 
135. Id. at 529-30. 
136. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984). 
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dominated” than that surrounding the types of interrogation at 
issue in Miranda and subsequent cases in which Miranda has 
been applied.137 
In Berkemer v. McCarty,138 after observing McCarty’s car 
weaving in and out of a highway lane, an officer of the Ohio 
State Highway Patrol forced him to stop and asked him to get 
out of the car.139  Upon noticing that McCarty was having 
difficulty standing, the officer concluded that McCarty would 
be charged with a traffic offense and would not be allowed to 
leave the scene.140  However, the officer never told McCarty 
that he would be taken into custody.141  When McCarty failed a 
field sobriety test, the officer asked if he had been using 
intoxicants and McCarty replied he consumed two beers and 
smoked marijuana a short time before.142  The officer then 
formally arrested McCarty and drove him to a county jail 
where a blood test failed to detect any alcohol in McCarty’s 
blood.143  The U.S. Supreme Court held that McCarty was not 
necessarily in custody from the moment he was required to exit 
his vehicle.144  This was because a reasonable person in 
McCarty’s position would have still felt they were free to 
leave.145 
 
137. Id. at 438-39. 
138. Id. at 420. 
139. Id. at 423. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 442. 
145. Id. at 437-38.   The Court states: 
 
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger 
that a person questioned will be induced “to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.” First, detention of a 
motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively 
temporary and brief.  The vast majority of roadside 
detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s 
expectations, when he sees an officer’s lights flashing 
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short 
period of time answering questions and waiting while the 
officer checks his license and registration; that he may then 
be given a citation, but that in the end, he most likely will 
be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, 
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
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Under Brendlin v. California,146 the driver and all 
passengers in a vehicle are seized for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, but are not necessarily “in custody” for the 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 
Traffic stops utilize the same objective reasonable suspect 
test.  If an objective reasonable motorist was in the suspect’s 
position, would she believe that she was free to leave.  Usually, 
a driver reasonably believes that she will be free to leave after 
a ticket has been issued to her.  This belief changes after the 
officer notifies the motorist that she is under arrest. 
 
  b.  Public Safety Exception 
 
An officer is not required to give Miranda warnings when 
the questioning is “reasonably prompted by a concern for the 
 
different from a stationhouse interrogation, which 
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is 
aware that questioning will continue until he provides his 
interrogators the answers they seek. 
 
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic 
stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the 
mercy of the police.  To be sure, the aura of authority 
surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge 
that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to 
issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the 
detainee to respond to questions.  But other aspects of the 
situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most 
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to 
some degree.  Passersby, on foot or in other cars, witness 
the interaction of the officer and motorist.  This exposure to 
public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous 
officer to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating 
statements and diminishes the motorist’s fear that, if he 
does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.  The fact 
that the detained motorist typically is confronted by only 
one or at most two officers further mutes any sense of 
vulnerability.  In short, the atmosphere surrounding an 
ordinary traffic stop is substantially less “police dominated” 
than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in 
Miranda itself. 
 
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437–39 (citations omitted). 
146. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
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public safety.”147  In New York v. Quarles, two officers were 
patrolling when a young woman approached their car telling 
them that she had just been “raped by a black male, 
approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket 
with the name ‘Big Ben’ printed in yellows on the back.”148  She 
said that he had just entered a supermarket and was carrying 
a gun.149  The officers drove to the supermarket and entered 
the store.150  They approached Benjamin Quarles at gun 
point.151  Quarles was apprehended, placed under arrest, put 
into handcuffs, and frisked.152  Officers discovered Quarles 
wore a shoulder holster but did not locate a gun.153  One of the 
officers asked Quarles where the gun was. Quarles nodded his 
head and said, “the gun is over there.”154  After the officer 
retrieved the gun, the officer Mirandized Quarles, who then 
asked to speak with an attorney.155 
On appeal, Quarles sought to suppress his communication 
regarding the location of the gun and the fruits therefrom.156  
The Supreme Court indicated although all three factors were 
present, in the interest of public safety, Miranda warnings 
were not necessary.157  The Quarles opinion created the “public 
safety exception” for Miranda.  The rationale is that when law 
enforcement is attempting to obtain information for public 
safety, rather than seeking to obtain an incriminating 
statement, there is no need for warnings, because “a threat to 
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule 
protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.”158  As explained by the Court: 
 
147. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). 
148. Id. at 651. 
149. Id. at 651-52. 
150. Id. at 652. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Quarles, 467 U,S,. at 652. 
154. Id. at 652. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 653. 
157. Id. at 657-68. 
158. Id. at 657.  The existence of a threat to public safety is determined 
by an objective inquiry.  Id. at 656.  It does not matter what the officer’s 
subjective belief or intent was at the time. Id. The test is what a reasonable 
officer would have perceived in light of the circumstances.  Id. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/5
 190 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:1 
 
We hold that on these facts there is a “public 
safety” exception to the requirement that 
Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s 
answers may be admitted into evidence, and that 
the availability of that exception does not depend 
upon the motivation of the individual officers 
involved.159 
   
  c.  Officer Safety/Terry Stops 
 
In Terry v. Ohio,160 the Supreme Court outlined that 
during a stop or investigatory detention, an officer may conduct 
a limited frisk of a suspect for weapons when the officer has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect has been 
engaged in, or is about to be engaged in, criminal activity and 
there is a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and 
presently dangerous.161  In the Terry opinion that came two 
years after Miranda, there is no discussion indicating warnings 
are required in situations where Terry would apply.  Thus, 
such situations are not viewed as “custodial” for purposes of 
Miranda. 
 
  d.  Routine Booking Questions & Questions of    
       Identification 
 
Routine questions asked for the purpose of identification 
only do not require Miranda warnings.  Although identification 
is typically an element of a crime and can be incriminating, 
questions about a defendant’s name, address, height, weight, 
eye color, and other identifying questions do not require the 
 
159. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655–56. See Marc Reiner, The 
public safety exception to Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 2377 (1995); Elizabeth Williams, What Circumstances Fall Within 
Public Safety Exception to General Requirement, Pursuant to or as Aid in 
Enforcement of Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, to Give Miranda  Warnings Before Custodial 
Interrogation –post-Quarles Cases, 142 A.L.R. FED. 229 (1997). 
160. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
161. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). 
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warnings.  Questions seeking identifying information are 
typical in any police encounter.  It is common for police to ask 
questions inquiring into an individual’s name or address when 
they are first stopped as well as when they are arrested and 
booked.162  Police are required to have a record of the suspect’s 
identity before a number of actions can even take place, such as 
an arrest and booking.  This biographical data thus falls into 
an exception that the Supreme Court has created—often 
referred to as “routine booking information.”163 
The Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Muniz164 that 
answers to questions eliciting a suspect’s name, address, 
height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age are 
routine booking questions and do not require Miranda 
warnings.  In Muniz, a patrol officer observed Inocencio Muniz 
and a passenger parked in a car on the shoulder of a 
highway.165  When the officer inquired whether Muniz needed 
assistance, the officer smelled alcohol on his breath.166  The 
officer told Muniz to keep the vehicle parked until his condition 
improved.167  As the officer walked back to his vehicle, Muniz 
drove off.168  The officer pursued him down the highway and 
pulled him over.169 After conducting a DUI investigation, the 
officer arrested Muniz and took him to jail.170  While at the jail, 
a booking officer asked Muniz his name, address, height, 
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age.171 Muniz 
responded to each of these questions, stumbling over his 
address and age.172 The officer then asked Muniz, “Do you 
 
162. Meghan S. Skelton & James G. Connell III, The Routine Booking 
Question Exception to Miranda, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 55, 55 (2004). 
163. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 584 (1990).  It should be 
noted that Muniz was a plurality opinion. Id.  So although a majority of the 
Supreme Court has not signed off on this exception, this exception has 
become a staple to Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. 
164. Id. at 584. 
165. Id. at 585 
166. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 585. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 585-86. 
172. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 586. 
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know what the date was of your sixth birthday?”173  After 
Muniz offered an inaudible reply, the officer repeated, “When 
you turned six years old, do you remember what the date 
was?”174  Muniz responded, “No, I don’t.”175 
A plurality of the Court decided routine booking questions 
are an exception to Miranda as such questions are designed to 
secure the “biographical data necessary to complete booking or 
pretrial services.”176 
 
 3.  Step Three: The Warnings 
 
If all three factors (authority, custody, and interrogation) 
apply, and there is no exception identified, then the suspect 
must be advised of the four warnings prescribed in Miranda.  
The four warnings that are required once Miranda applies are 
as follows: 
 
1. He has the right to remain silent; 
2. Anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of  law; 
3. He has the right to the presence of an attorney; 
and 
4. If he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
appointed for  him prior to any questioning if he 
desires. 
 
If the police do not provide these four warnings during a 
custodial interrogation, then any statement obtained is 
inadmissible in a prosecution’s case-in-chief, even if the 
statement was voluntary.  However, the general rule is that 
voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda can be 
introduced to impeach the testimony of the defendant if he 
testifies at trial. 
 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 586. 
176. Id. at 601.  Although the court held that name, address, height, 
weight, eye color, date of birth, and age were admissible, the question about 
Muniz’s sixth birthday was not covered by the “routine booking” exception.  
Id. 
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Recently, in Florida v. Powell,177 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the form of the warnings was not as important as the 
content conveyed.  Thus, when giving the Miranda warnings, it 
is not necessary to read them in the order as delineated in the 
Miranda opinion, nor to recite them verbatim.178  All that is 
required is for an officer to “clearly inform” the suspect of them 
prior to custodial interrogation.  Law enforcement is permitted 
to use different words than those prescribed in Miranda as long 
as they communicate the same essential message.179  If the 
warnings are “sufficiently comprehensive and comprehensible 
 
177. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010).  On August 10, 2004, law 
enforcement officers in Tampa, Florida, seeking to apprehend respondent 
Kevin Powell in connection with a robbery investigation, entered an 
apartment rented by Powell’s girlfriend.  Id. at 53.  After spotting Powell 
coming from a bedroom, the officers searched the room and discovered a 
loaded nine-millimeter handgun under the bed.  Id.  The officers arrested 
Powell and transported him to the Tampa Police headquarters. Id. Once 
there, and before asking Powell any questions, the officers read Powell the 
standard Tampa Police Department Consent and Release Form 310.  Id.  The 
form states: 
 
You have the right to remain silent.  If you give up the right 
to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you 
in court.  You have the right to talk to a lawyer before 
answering any of our questions.  If you cannot afford to hire 
a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and 
before any questioning.  You have the right to use any of 
these rights at any time you want during this interview. 
 
Id. at 54 (emphasis added).  Acknowledging that he had been informed of his 
rights, that he “understood them,” and that he was “willing to talk” to the 
officers, Powell signed the form.  Id.  He then admitted that he owned the 
handgun found in the apartment.  Id.  Powell knew he was prohibited from 
possessing a gun because he had previously been convicted of a felony, but 
said he had nevertheless purchased and carried the firearm for his 
protection.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that the Miranda warnings 
provided adequately informed Powell of his right to consult with a lawyer and 
to have the lawyer with him during the interrogation, even though they were 
not verbatim recitations of language from Miranda.  Id. at 60. When 
administering Miranda warnings, the language must reasonably convey the 
content of Miranda to a suspect.  Id.  Although the warnings were not the 
clearest iteration, they were both comprehensive and comprehensible when 
viewed in a commonsense reading.  Id. at 63. 
  178. Id. at 60.  See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); California 
v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981). 
179. Powell, 559 U.S. at 64. 
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when given a commonsense reading,” they satisfy Miranda.180 
 
B.  Second Prong: Waiver and Invocation of Miranda Rights 
 
The second prong of the Miranda analysis is whether or 
not the suspect waived his constitutional rights or invoked 
them.  After the warnings have been given during a custodial 
interrogation by the police, the suspect may invoke or waive his 
rights to an attorney and to remain silent.  Generally, a suspect 
may exercise his right to have a lawyer present or to remain 
silent at any time during the questioning.  This means a 
suspect could start talking to police and then decide halfway 
through the questioning to invoke.  It also means the 
opposite—they may invoke right at the start, but then notify 
the police that they want to speak.  Step Four examines what 
constitutes invocation and what constitutes a valid waiver. 
 
 1.  Step Four: Invocation of Rights or Waiver of Rights 
 
When a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or to 
speak with an attorney, the police must immediately cease the 
interrogation.  However, the invocation must be clearly and 
explicitly made.  Simply remaining silent is not sufficient to 
invoke the right to remain silent.181  This also means that a 
suspect must be extremely clear when they request an 
attorney.  There is a significant difference between “I want an 
attorney” versus “Officer, do you think I should speak with an 
attorney?”  Finally, when a suspect waives the right to remain 
silent or to have an attorney present, the waiver must be 
knowingly and intelligently made. 
Step Four explores the difference between an individual 
invoking their constitutional rights or waiving them under 
Miranda.  The choice a suspect makes determines the direction 
the law enforcement officer must follow. 
 
  a.  Invocation 
 
 
180. Id. at 63. 
181. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
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The protection that Miranda provides to a suspect is that 
when the suspect asserts either of his rights, the prosecution 
may not introduce any facts or evidence that the defendant 
remained silent while undergoing police questioning post-
arrest.  When a suspect invokes his Miranda rights the police 
must immediately cease the interrogation.182  The rationale of 
this rule, often referred to as the Edwards rule, 
 
[I]s that once a suspect indicates that “he is not 
capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning 
without advice of counsel,” “any subsequent 
waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, 
and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself 
the product of the ‘inherently compelling 
pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of 
the suspect.” . . . The Edwards presumption of 
involuntariness ensures that police will not take 
advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of 
“prolonged police custody,” by repeatedly 
attempting to question a suspect who previously 
requested counsel until the suspect is “badgered 
into submission.”183 
 
This invocation must be clearly explicit.  The rule 
prescribed by the Court is that a suspect’s request must be 
unambiguous and unequivocal.184  In Davis v. United States,185 
 
182. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1975) (officers must cease 
questioning once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent).  See Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (an accused “having expressed his 
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to 
him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, 
or conversations with the police”).  The Court in Berghuis confirmed the rule 
articulated in Davis—that there needs to be a clear invocation of ones 
rights—applies to both the right to remain silent and the right to an 
attorney.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
183. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2010) (citations omitted) 
(citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988)). 
184. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  The court states: 
 
A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to 
counsel after having that right explained to him has 
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the Supreme Court outlined that if a suspect does not clearly 
assert his right to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation, then the ambiguous request does not invoke the 
protections of Miranda.  Robert Davis was a navy 
serviceman.186  After a fight at a pool hall on a naval base, 
Davis was brought in for questioning.187  Investigators advised 
Davis of his Miranda rights and Davis agreed to waive them, 
both orally and in writing.188  As the investigation proceeded, 
Davis stated, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer?”189  The 
investigators reminded Davis of his rights and then proceeded 
with an additional hour of questioning.190  Davis provided 
incriminating statements.  The Court indicated that if a 
suspect does not make an unambiguous request, the 
questioning does not have to stop.191  Further, the police do not 
have to ask clarifying questions to determine if the suspect 
really does want a lawyer.  “A statement either is such an 
assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.”192  Although a 
suspect need not speak with a law enforcement official, “he 
must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be a request for an 
attorney.193  If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of 
clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop 
questioning the suspect.”194 
 
indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted.  
Although Edwards provides an additional protection—if a 
suspect subsequently requests an attorney, questioning 
must cease—it is one that must be affirmatively invoked by 
the suspect. 
 
Id. at 460–61. 
 185. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
 186. Id. at 454. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 455. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455 (1994). 
 191. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 192. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984) (citing Justice Simon’s 
dissent in People v. Smith, 466 N.E.2d 236, 241 (1984)). 
 193. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
 194. Id. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n. 4 (1986). 
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Likewise, just because a suspect remains silent does not 
mean they are invoking their right to remain silent.195  This 
also means that a suspect must be extremely clear both when 
they request an attorney and when they desire to remain 
silent.  As iterated above, there is a significant distinction 
between “I want an attorney” versus “Maybe I should talk to a 
lawyer?” 
In Maryland v. Shatzer,196 the Supreme Court created a 
“break-in-custody” exception upon a proper invocation of one’s 
rights.  In Shatzer, police received information from a social 
worker that Michael Shatzer, Sr. had sexually abused his 
three-year-old son.197  At the time law enforcement learned this 
information, Shatzer was incarcerated at the Maryland 
Correctional Institution, serving a sentence on an unrelated 
child-sexual-abuse offense.198  Detective Blankenship went to 
the correctional institution to question Shatzer.199  Before 
questioning began, Detective Blankenship advised Shatzer of 
his Miranda rights.200  Shatzer invoked his right to an attorney 
immediately.201 Detective Blankenship left and thereafter 
 
 195. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2181 (2013).  See also Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).  In Berghuis, officers were investigating a 
murder.  Id. at 374.  An officer advised Van Chester Thompkins of his rights 
using a form.  Id. 374-75.  The form included the four warnings required by 
Miranda and an additional warning not required by Miranda: “You have the 
right to decide at any time before or during questioning to use your right to 
remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being 
questioned.”  Id. at 375.  Thompkins read the fifth warning, but declined to 
sign the form.  Id.  During the interrogation, Thompkins never stated that he 
wanted to remain silent, did not want to talk with the officers, or wanted a 
lawyer.  Id.  About two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, 
during which Thompkins was mostly silent, an officer asked him if he “prays 
to God to forgive him for shooting that boy down?”  Id. at 376.  In response to 
this question, Thompkins said “yes” and looked away.  Id.  The interview 
ended shortly thereafter.  Id.  Since Thompkins never said he wanted to 
remain silent, the statements were held admissible.  Id. at 388-89.  Salinas 
takes the Thompkins case one step further, saying that the prosecution’s use 
of Salinas’s noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment, and 
that there is no exception to invocation requirement for a witness to who 
declines to give an answer to police.  Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2181. 
  196. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010). 
197. Id. at 100. 
198. Id. at 101. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
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closed the investigation.202  Two years and six months later, the 
same social worker referred more specific allegations to 
police.203  Detective Hoover was assigned the case.204  Detective 
Hoover went back to the correctional facility and again advised 
Shatzer of his Miranda rights.205  This time, Shatzer signed a 
written waiver and proceeded to confess to the sexual abuse of 
his son.206  The State used the confession to convict Shatzer.207 
On appeal, Shatzer argued that since he had invoked his rights 
two-and-a-half years earlier, that Detective Hoover should not 
have been allowed to question him.208 
The Supreme Court concluded that the Edwards rule 
should not be extended indefinitely.209  When a break in 
custody is of “sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive 
effects,” police may reinitiate questioning.210  The Court felt 
that “law enforcement officers need to know, with certainty and 
beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful.”211  
Ultimately, the Court determined that fourteen days was the 
appropriate amount of time that had to lapse to have a proper 
break in custody.212  “That provides plenty of time for the 
suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with 
friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive 
effects of his prior custody.”213 
 
  b.  Waivers 
 
The Fifth Amendment protects an individual’s right 
against self-incrimination and an individual’s right to counsel 
in custodial interrogation.214  Because these are the rights of 
 
202. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 101. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 101-02. 
207. Id. at 102. 
208. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 103. 
209. Id. at 109. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 110. 
  212. Id. 
  213. Id. 
  214. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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the individual, such individual can waive them. Waiver can be 
either expressed or implied. 
Express waivers are the cleanest method.  Customarily, an 
express waiver is in written form that provides the rules and 
warnings prescribed by Miranda and its progeny.  This allows 
for the suspect to review the warning and then sign the waiver 
acknowledging he understands them and is thereby waiving 
the right to an attorney as well as the right to remain silent.  
As long as there is no coercion on the part of law enforcement, 
the express waiver leaves little room for dispute.  Even if a 
suspect refuses to sign a written waiver, this does not 
necessarily negate a waiver of Miranda rights through a 
subsequent course of conduct.215  For example, if a suspect 
provides law enforcement with an oral statement, while 
refusing to sign a written transcript of that statement, it does 
not necessarily mean that the suspect failed to waive his 
rights.216 
In practice, however, most waivers are implied.  Implied 
waivers leave room for more argument on both sides.  It should 
be noted that police are not required to obtain an express 
waiver before commencing an interrogation.217  An implied 
waiver occurs when a suspect does not expressly state that he 
is waiving his rights, but rather, his words or conduct indicate 
an abandonment of those rights.218  Prosecutors carry the 
burden of demonstrating that a suspect was aware of his rights 
and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. 
Further, just as only the suspect can waive his or her 
rights, the invocation must also be executed by the suspect 
 
  215. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).  In Butler, the 
Supreme Court stated that an “express” waiver is not required per Miranda.  
Id. at 375-76.  The only question is whether the individual waived the 
exercise of one of his rights.  Id. at 374. 
  216. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987).  In Barrett, the suspect 
was in custody on suspicion of sexual assault and was advised of his Miranda 
rights three times.  Id. at 525.  On each occasion, after signing and dating an 
acknowledgement that he had been given his rights, he advised police he 
would not make a written statement but would talk about the crime.  Id.  
After the second and third time the rights were advised, he indicated that he 
would not make a written statement outside the presence of an attorney, and 
then proceeded to orally admit his involvement in the sexual assault.  Id. 
  217. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387-88 (2010). 
218. Id. 
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personally. That is, someone else cannot assert either the right 
to an attorney or the right to remain silent on behalf of a 
suspect.  The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Moran v. 
Burbine.219  In Burbine, a woman was murdered in a factory 
parking lot in Providence, Rhode Island.220  After several 
months of investigation, detectives brought in Brian Burbine 
for breaking and entering charges, which then led to the 
murder investigation.221 While detectives were questioning 
Burbine at the police station, Burbine’s sister contacted the 
Public Defender’s Office to obtain legal assistance for her 
brother.222  An attorney then contacted the police station and 
spoke with detectives.223  She identified herself and informed 
the detectives that Burbine had an attorney and that they 
should stop questioning until that attorney could be present.224  
The police did not inform Burbine of the attorney’s telephone 
call.225  The Supreme Court held this failure to inform did not 
deprive Burbine of information essential to his ability to 
knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent 
and to the presence of counsel.226  “Events occurring outside of 
the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely 
can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and 
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”227  Once it is 
demonstrated that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights 
was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute 
and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s 
intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the 
analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.  
The level of the police’s culpability—whether intentional or 
inadvertent—in failing to inform respondent of the telephone 
call has no bearing on the validity of the waivers.228 
 
 
219. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
220. Id. at 416. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 417. 
224. Id. 
225. Moran, 475 U.S. at 417. 
226. Id. at 428. 
227. Id. at 422. 
228. Id. at 413. 
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 2.  Step Five: Voluntary 
 
Even before Miranda, a suspect’s confession was 
admissible only if it was given voluntarily.229  Regardless of 
whether the Miranda warnings are given, a confession must be 
obtained without police coercion. 
 
Any statement given freely and voluntarily 
without any compelling influences is, of course, 
admissible in evidence.  The fundamental import 
of the privilege while an individual is in custody 
is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police 
without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but 
whether he can be interrogated. . . . Volunteered 
statements of any kind are not barred by the 
Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not 
affected by our holding today.230 
 
The test for determining the “voluntariness” of a confession 
centers on whether or not there is police coercion. Courts have 
held that coercion by non-governmental personnel does not 
count as involuntary.231  When a confession is obtained by 
police coercion, making it involuntary, it must be excluded from 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief, as well as prohibited from use 
as impeachment evidence of a defendant’s testimony.  
Involuntary confessions are quite different than confessions 
 
229. In Hopt v. Utah the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the requirement 
that a defendant’s out-of-court admissions must be voluntarily made in order 
to be used at trial.  Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-87 (1884). 
230. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987) (quoting Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)). 
  231. For example: Victim says to a suspect, “Because you shot me, I will 
take revenge on you by shooting your sister unless you turn yourself into the 
police and confess.”  Suspect then goes to the police and confesses.  This 
confession would likely be treated as “voluntary” and admitted against the 
suspect at a criminal trial, even though, in a sense, it was the product of 
coercion by Victim.  As long as there is no police coercion, statements made 
will typically be deemed “voluntary.”  Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279 (1991). 
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obtained in violation of Miranda that may be admitted to 
impeach a defendant’s testimony on the stand. 
A waiver of Miranda must be “voluntary in the sense that 
it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception.”232  The focus of the 
inquiry in determining if a wavier is voluntary is whether there 
was “official coercion.”233  The Supreme Court emphasized this 
point in Colorado v. Connelly.234  In that case, the defendant, 
Francis Connelly, suffered from “chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia.”235  Connelly approached an on-duty officer, and 
without any prompting, began to reveal details about a murder 
he committed.236  The officer informed Connelly of his Miranda 
rights, and Connelly indicated he understood them but still 
wanted to tell the officer about the murder.237  Again, the 
officer warned Connelly that he did not have an obligation to 
tell the officer anything.238  Despite the warnings, Connelly 
informed the officer “his conscience had been bothering him” 
and he wished to talk about the murder.239 
In addressing the issue of Miranda waiver, the Court held: 
 
Miranda protects defendants against 
government coercion leading them to surrender 
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes 
no further than that. Respondent’s perception of 
coercion flowing from the “voice of God,” however 
important or significant such a perception may 
be in other disciplines, is a matter to which the 
United States Constitution does not speak.240 
 
Accordingly, a mental illness will not, in and of itself, 
 
232. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
233. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985).  The Fifth Amendment 
is not concerned “with moral and psychological pressures to confess 
emanating from sources other than official coercion.”  Id. 
234. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
235. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
236. Id. at 160. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170–71. 
45
  
2015 THE RIGHT TO BE CONFUSED 203 
necessarily preclude a determination that a suspect voluntarily 
waived Miranda rights as long as the police do not coerce the 
suspect into waiving his rights, the suspect’s mental illness will 
not impair the validity of a waiver.241 
Likewise, in Colorado v. Spring,242 the Court held that 
where a suspect did not know he could be interrogated about a 
separate crime aside from what the suspect was arrested for,243 
there was “no doubt” the Fifth Amendment waiver was 
voluntary.244  The Court stated that the suspect’s “allegation 
that the police failed to supply him with certain information 
does not relate to any of the traditional indicia of coercion: ‘the 
duration and conditions of detention . . . , the manifest attitude 
of the police toward him, his physical and mental state, the 
diverse pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance 
and self-control.’”245  Thus, the inquiry is whether coercive 
police conduct overcame the suspect’s will and “critically 
impaired” the suspect’s “capacity for self-determination.”246 
Law enforcement must be careful when interrogating a 
suspect in more than one session. If the suspect invokes his 
right to remain silent in the first session, police cannot wait a 
couple of hours and then re-commence interrogation.  Where 
the second interrogation is about a different crime and the 
police give new Miranda warnings prior to the second 
interrogation, a waiver given by the suspect is likely valid 
despite his insistence on remaining silent at the first 
interrogation.  However, after a person in custody has 
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by authorities 
until counsel has been made available unless the accused 
“initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations 
with the police.”247  In such situations, law enforcement cannot 
talk to the suspect about ANYTHING, including old, present, 
 
241. Id. 
242. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987). 
243. Id. at 567–68. 
244. Id. at 573. 
245. Id. at 574 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 
(1961)) (alteration in original). 
246. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574. 
247. Arizona v. Robertson, 486 U.S. 675, 677 (1988). 
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or new crimes.  Law enforcement can reinitiate an 
interrogation after fourteen days, but must make sure Miranda 
warnings are given again.248 
 
 3.  Step Six: Knowingly & Intelligently 
 
Miranda requires that any decision to waive the right 
against self-incrimination be made knowingly and 
intelligently.249  The requirement of a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of rights means that the suspect must have cognitive 
faculties for understanding the meaning and effect of 
statements he may give.  In determining whether there has 
been an intelligent waiver, various factors, which were often 
considered in pre-Miranda confession cases under the “totality 
of circumstances” test,250 are extremely relevant.  The Supreme 
Court has never definitively set forth a set of factors in a single 
case that make up the totality of the circumstances.  However, 
certain factors have been identified in various cases.  The 
factors relevant to determining whether a statement was 
knowingly and intelligently made include the suspect’s age, 
experience, education, background, intelligence, presence or 
absence of prior contact with the police, and whether he has 
the capacity to understand the warnings given to him, the 
nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of 
waiving those rights.251 
 
248. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010).  In 2003, the police 
interviewed Shatzer—then serving a sentence for an unrelated offense—
regarding allegations that he sexually abused his three-year-old son.  Id. at 
100.  Shatzer invoked his right to counsel, ending the interrogation.  Id. at 
101.  The investigation was subsequently closed.  Id.  In 2006, while Shatzer 
remained incarcerated, a new investigation began.  Id.  Shatzer waived his 
Miranda rights and denied allegations that he forced his son to perform 
fellatio on him.  Id.  However, Shatzer admitted to masturbating in front of 
his son.  Id. at 101-02.  Several days later, Shatzer was again Mirandized and 
then failed a polygraph.  Id. at 102.  Immediately after questioning, Shatzer 
began to cry and stated, “I didn’t force him. I didn’t force him.”  Id. 
249. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
250. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). 
251. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).  See also 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 
(1986); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Fare v. Michael C., 442 
U.S. 707 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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In Moran v. Burbine,252 the Supreme Court set forth a two-
part test that aggregates both “knowing” and “intelligent.”253  
In assessing a waiver of Miranda, the test first assesses 
whether such waiver was voluntary; the second part assesses 
whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.  In 
determining if a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the 
pertinent inquiry is whether the defendant understood the 
right to remain silent and anything said could be used as 
evidence.254  A waiver is deemed knowing and intelligent if it is 
“made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it.”255 
However, “events occurring outside of the presence of the 
suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no 
bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly 
relinquish a constitutional right.”256  This is because the U.S. 
“Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know 
and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege.”257  The decision in Burbine is 
illustrative of what factors are considered when determining if 
a waiver is knowing and intelligent.  There, law enforcement 
received a tip that the defendant Brian Burbine was involved 
in a burglary that resulted in a murder.258 Officers read 
Burbine his Miranda rights and he refused to execute a written 
waiver.259  Officers received statements from other suspects 
further implicating Burbine and questioning continued.260  A 
few hours into the questioning, Burbine’s sister phoned the 
office of the public defender in an attempt to obtain legal 
assistance for her brother.261  Eventually, an assistant public 
defender called and informed officers she intended to act as 
 
252. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. 
253. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010) (discussing 
that a waiver inquiry involves two aspects). 
254. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574. 
255. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. 
256. Id. at 422. 
257. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574. 
258. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 416. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
  261. Id. 
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counsel if police sought to question the defendant.262  The 
officer informed the public defender they were done 
questioning Burbine for the night.263 
Shortly thereafter, officers began a series of interviews 
with Burbine.264  The officers informed Burbine of his Miranda 
rights each time and Burbine signed a waiver form.265  The 
officers never informed Burbine of the public defender’s 
attempts to get in contact with him and Burbine eventually 
provided incriminating statements.266  The case made its way 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.267  While recognizing that the fact 
an attorney was calling to speak with Burbine would be helpful 
to him in deciding whether to waive Miranda rights, the Court 
stated the Constitution does not require “that the police supply 
a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his 
self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his 
rights.”268  The Court continued, “Once it is determined that a 
suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that 
he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, 
and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his 
statements to secure a conviction, the analysisis complete and 
the waiver is valid as a matter of law.”269  Accordingly, the 
requirement of knowing and intelligent involves a rudimentary 
showing of understanding.  Where there is no allegation that a 
defendant “failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment” or that the defendant 
“misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to law 
enforcement,” a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently in 
the context of Miranda.270 
 
IV.  Part III: Ramifications for violating Miranda 
 
 
  262. Id. at 417. 
  263. Id. 
  264. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 417. 
  265. Id. 
  266. Id. at 418. 
  267. Id. at 418–20. 
  268. Id. at 422. 
  269. Id. at 422–23. 
270. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 575 (1987). 
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When a confession is obtained in violation of Miranda, it 
may not be used or introduced as part of the prosecution’s case-
in-chief.  If one of the steps is missed or violated, the confession 
cannot be used as evidence of the suspect’s guilt.  However, the 
prosecution may be able to use the statements to impeach a 
defendant’s testimony at trial if the statements’ 
“trustworthiness . . . satisfies legal standards.”271  As long as 
the statement is not obtained as a result of coercion or was 
involuntary for any reason, the statement will be deemed 
“trustworthy” for impeachment purposes.272 
 
271. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).  Vivien Harris was 
charged for selling heroin to an undercover officer.  Id. at 222.  At trial, the 
State’s chief witness, the undercover officer, testified to the details of the two 
sales.  Id. at 223.  A second officer verified collateral details of the sales and a 
third officer offered testimony about the chemical analysis of heroin.  Id.  
Harris took the stand in his own defense.  Id.  He admitted knowing the 
undercover police officer but denied the sale on January 4, 1966.  Id.  Harris 
also testified that the substance provided to the officer on January 6, 1966 
was baking powder and a part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser.  Id.  On 
cross-examination, the prosecution asked Harris whether he made specified 
statements to the police immediately following his arrest on January 7, 1966.  
Id.  These statements partially contradicted Harris’s direct testimony at trial.  
Id.  In response, Harris testified he could not remember virtually any of the 
questions or answers recited by the prosecutor.  Id.  The prosecution read the 
statement, obtained in violation of Miranda, in which Harris admitted to the 
sale.  Id.  The prosecution sought the prior statements to be considered by the 
jury regarding Harris’s credibility.  Id.  In addressing the propriety of the 
prosecution’s use of the prior statement, the Supreme Court held, “The shield 
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way 
of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent 
utterances.”  Id. at 226.  See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
272. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).  In Mincey, undercover 
police officer Barry Headricks arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from 
Rufus Mincey.  Id. at 387.  The officer left to obtain money, and when he 
arrived back, he brought nine other officers in plain clothes.  Id.  The 
undercover officer knocked on the door and it was opened by John Hodgman, 
one of three acquaintances of Mincey, who were in the living room of the 
apartment.  Id.  Officer Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly into the 
bedroom.  Id.   Hodgman attempted to slam the door in order to keep the 
other officers from entering, but was pushed back against the wall.  Id.  As 
police entered the apartment, a rapid volley of shots was heard from the 
bedroom.  Id.  Officer Headricks emerged and collapsed on the floor after 
being shot and subsequently died.  Id.  When other officers entered the 
bedroom, they found Mincey lying on the floor, wounded and semiconscious.  
Id.  Homicide detectives arrived on the scene to take charge of the 
investigation and proceeded to conduct an exhaustive four-day warrantless 
search of the apartment.  Id. at 389.  This included the opening of dresser 
drawers, the ripping up of carpets, and the seizure of 200 to 300 objects.  Id.  
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Next, Miranda is generally not subject to the typical 
Fourth Amendment “fruit of the poisonous tree”273 analysis.  
Evidence obtained as a result of a statement in violation of 
Miranda is usually not suppressed.274 The Supreme Court in 
Michigan v. Tucker275 held that the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine does not apply in the traditional fashion to Miranda 
violations.276  The police “did not abridge respondent’s 
 
In the evening of the same day as the raid, one of the detectives went to the 
hospital where petitioner was confined in the intensive-care unit.  Id. at 396.  
After giving Mincey his Miranda warnings, the detective proceeded to 
interrogate him while he was lying in bed barely conscious, encumbered by 
tubes, needles, and a breathing apparatus, and despite the fact that Mincey 
repeatedly asked that the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer.  Id.  
The Supreme Court held that where statements are not “the product of 
rational intellect and free will” they cannot be used in a criminal trial, even 
for impeachment purposes.  Id. at 398.  Mincey “was weakened by pain and 
shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious 
and his will was simply overborne.”  Id. at 401–02.  Accordingly, Mincey’s 
statements were not the product of his free and rationale choice.  Id. 
273. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  Wong Sun 
establishes the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.  Id.  The fruits of police 
conduct that actually infringed a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights must 
be suppressed.  Id. at 485.  In Wong Sun the police discovered evidence 
through statements made by the accused after he had been placed under 
arrest.  Id. at 490.  The Court, found that the arrest had occurred without 
probable cause and held that the derivative evidence could not be introduced 
against the accused at trial.  Id. at 491. 
274. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
275. On the morning of April 19, 1966, a forty-three-year-old woman in 
Pontiac, Michigan was found in her home by a friend and coworker, Luther 
White, in serious condition.  Id. at 435.  At the time she was found, the 
woman was tied, gagged, partially disrobed, and had been both raped and 
severely beaten.  Id.  She was unable to tell White anything about her assault 
at that time and still remains unable to recollect what happened.  Id.  While 
contacting police, White observed a dog in the house.  Id.  The victim did not 
own a dog so this was strange to White.  Id. at 435-36.  Upon their arrival, 
the police were able to track the dog back to Thomas Tucker.  Id. at 436.  The 
police brought Tucker to the station and questioned him about the rape.  Id.  
They advised him of his rights, except failed to state he would be furnished 
counsel free of charge if he could not pay for such services.  Id.  (discussing 
such a violation of Miranda).  Tucker provided information about a witness, 
Robert Henderson, who he had been with.  Id.  Police took that information 
and followed up by speaking with Henderson.  Id.  Henderson provided police 
information that Tucker told him regarding scratches on Tucker’s face and 
about a sexual encounter Tucker had with a woman that lived on the next 
block over.  Id. at 436-37.  The prosecution used this statement at trial.  Id. at 
437. 
276. Id. at 445.  The purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule is to deter unreasonable searches, no matter how probative their fruits.  
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constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 
but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid 
down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”277  
Miranda deals only with the Fifth Amendment, so it is only 
applies to statements.  The Fifth Amendment is not concerned 
with nontestimonial evidence.278  “Indeed, far from being 
prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by 
wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable. . . . Absent 
some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not violated by even the most damning 
admissions.”279 
The Court in Oregon v. Elstad280 eloquently explained that 
a Miranda violation is not a true Constitutional violation, and 
thus, the normal suppression rules do not apply.281  That case 
involved a home that was burglarized.282  Items missing from 
the home included art objects and furnishings valued at around 
$150,000.283  A witness contacted the police and implicated 
Michael Elstad, who was an eighteen-year-old neighbor and 
friend of the victim home’s teenage son.284  Police obtained a 
warrant for Elstad’s arrest and went to speak with him at his 
residence.285  An officer first sat down with Elstad in his living 
room and asked him about the burglary.286  After Elstad 
 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216–217 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 600–602 (1975). “The exclusionary rule. . .when utilized to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are 
distinct from those it serves under the Fifth.”  Brown, 422 U.S. at 601.  
Where a Fourth Amendment violation “taints” the confession, a finding of 
voluntariness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold 
requirement in determining whether the confession may be admitted in 
evidence.  Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982).  “Beyond this, the 
prosecution must show a sufficient break in events to undermine the 
inference that the confession was caused by the Fourth Amendment 
violation.”  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985). 
277. Id. at 445–46. 
278. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
279. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). 
280. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
281. Id. at 318. 
282. Id. at 300. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-01. 
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confessed to the crime, the officers arrested him, placed him in 
the back of the patrol car, and took him to the police station.287  
At the station, the officers advised Elstad for the first time of 
his Miranda rights.288  Elstad gave a second confession and 
provided a full statement.289  The Supreme Court held that 
second confession was admissible and went through an 
analysis as to why the unwarned first confession did not taint 
the second confession.290 
 
The arguments advanced in favor of suppression 
of respondent’s written confession rely heavily on 
metaphor.  One metaphor, familiar from the 
Fourth Amendment context, would require that 
respondent’s confession, regardless of its 
integrity, voluntariness, and probative value, be 
suppressed as the “tainted fruit of the poisonous 
tree” of the Miranda violation.  A second 
metaphor questions whether a confession can be 
truly voluntary once the “cat is out of the bag.”  
Taken out of context, each of these metaphors 
can be misleading.  They should not be used to 
obscure fundamental differences between the 
role of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
and the function of Miranda in guarding against 
the prosecutorial use of compelled statements as 
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.  The Oregon 
court assumed and respondent here contends 
that a failure to administer Miranda warnings 
necessarily breeds the same consequences as 
police infringement of a constitutional right, so 
that evidence uncovered following an unwarned 
statement must be suppressed as “fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”  We believe this view 
misconstrues the nature of the protections 
afforded by Miranda warnings and therefore 
misreads the consequences of police failure to 
 
287. Id. at 301. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 318. 
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supply them.291 
 
. . .The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, 
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more 
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may 
be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth 
Amendment violation.  The Fifth Amendment 
prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in 
chief only of compelled testimony.  Failure to 
administer Miranda warnings creates a 
presumption of compulsion.  Consequently, 
unwarned statements that are otherwise 
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from 
evidence under Miranda.  Thus, in the individual 
case, Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a 
remedy even to the defendant who has suffered 
no identifiable constitutional harm.292 
 
In accord with Elstad, most courts have held that Miranda 
violations will not require the exclusion of derivative evidence, 
even when that evidence is physical.  The Court, thirty years 
later, held that the two-stage interrogation technique violates 
Miranda, saying that the second confessions are inadmissible 
and violate the spirit of the rule.293 Although this technique 
violates Miranda it does little to deviate away from the same 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis regarding derivative 
evidence.  In United States v. Patane,294 the Supreme Court 
addressed the specific issue of “whether a failure to give a 
suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona 
requires suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s 
unwarned but voluntary statements.”295  The Court continued, 
“Because the Miranda rule protects against violations of the 
Self–Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not implicated by 
 
291. Id. at 303–04. 
292. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07.  See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 
654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). 
  293. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
294. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).  
295. Id. at 633-34. 
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the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from 
voluntary statements, we answer the question presented in the 
negative.”296 
In that case, Samuel Patane was arrested for harassing his 
ex-girlfriend.297  He was released on bond, subject to a 
restraining order that prohibited him from contacting the 
victim.298  Patane violated the order by telephoning the 
victim.299  At the time, officers had been investigating Patane 
on another matter relating to illegally possessing a firearm (a 
Glock pistol).300  A county probation officer informed police of 
the violation of the order.301  Officers went to Patane’s 
residence and placed him under arrest.302  One detective tried 
to advise Patane of his rights but only made it to, “You have 
the Right to Remain Silent.”303  At this point, Patane 
interrupted and said he knew his rights and none of the officers 
completed the warning.304 One of the detectives then asked 
Patane about the firearm.305  Patane was initially reluctant to 
discuss the matter and stated, “I am not sure I should tell you 
anything about the Glock because I don’t want you to take it 
away from me.”306  After the detective persisted, Patane told 
him that the pistol was in his bedroom and also gave the 
detective permission to retrieve the pistol.307 The detective 
found the pistol and seized it.308  The Court held: 
 
The Miranda rule “does not require that the 
statements [taken without complying with the 
rule] and their fruits be discarded as inherently 
tainted.”  Such a blanket suppression rule could 
 
296. Id. at 634. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Patane, 542 U.S. at 634. 
301. Id. at 634-35. 
302. Id. at 635. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Patane, 542 U.S. at 635. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
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not be justified by reference to the “Fifth 
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy 
evidence” or by any deterrence rationale, and 
would therefore fail our close-fit requirement.  
Furthermore, the Self–Incrimination Clause 
contains its own exclusionary rule.  It provides 
that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  
Unlike the Fourth Amendment’s bar on 
unreasonable searches, the Self–Incrimination 
Clause is self-executing.  We have repeatedly 
explained “that those subjected to coercive police 
interrogations have an automatic protection from 
the use of their involuntary statements (or 
evidence derived from their statements) in any 
subsequent criminal trial.”  This explicit textual 
protection supports a strong presumption against 
expanding the Miranda rule any further.309 
 
Therefore, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does 
not apply or extend to Miranda.  Dissimilar to searches in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment 
contains a built-in safeguard that does not need to be 
expanded. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
After fifty years, Miranda v. Arizona has become second 
nature in the criminal justice system.  Since its primary rule 
was fictitiously created out of the Fifth Amendment, it has 
caused much confusion among law enforcement officials, legal 
practitioners, and trial judges as to its application in the 
admissibility of confessions.  For five decades, courts have 
struggled to provide an adequate framework for practitioners 
to do their job.  Miranda’s evolution and modern day 
application has needed a template for the day-to-day 
administration of justice.  This six-step analysis provides a 
practical model for those in the justice system to apply the 
 
309. Id. at 639–40 (citations omitted). 
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principles that Miranda was established on. 
 
The two-prong test presented captures the Supreme 
Court’s continued discussion and interpretation of Miranda.  
The first prong centers on whether Miranda applies.  Step One 
sets forth the primary rule of establishing the three factors 
that must exist: existence of an authority figure (for example, 
police) engaged in custodial interrogation.  If these three 
factors are present, then Step Two discusses the four 
exceptions that have been carved out of Miranda: (i) routine 
traffic stops, (ii) public safety, (iii) officer safety, and (iv) 
routine booking questions.  If no exception applies, Step Three 
explains how to advise the suspect of the four warnings 
prescribed by Miranda. 
The second prong centers on whether the suspect has 
invoked or waived Miranda rights.  Step Four explained that a 
suspect must clearly and unequivocally invoke their rights, 
otherwise, their statements can be used against them.  Step 
Five clarifies that police cannot exert unlawful coercion over 
the suspect and the statements made must be voluntary.  
Finally, Step Six ensures that the suspect knowingly and 
intelligently waive these rights. 
If both prongs are followed and all six steps adhered to, 
statements made by a suspect should be admissible as evidence 
in a subsequent case.  If the steps are not complied with, then 
statements can, and often times likely will, be excluded.  When 
Miranda is violated, the Fifth Amendment excludes 
subsequent statements.  However, such a violation does not 
necessarily lead to the exclusion of physical evidence (although 
possible). 
Miranda continues to evolve.  Practitioners in the criminal 
justice system continue to see what new interpretations, new 
exceptions, new analyses, and new rulings come out each year.  
The living creature embodied in Miranda is simultaneously 
both exciting and frustrating.  Ultimately with Miranda, if a 
practitioner follows the six-step analysis outlined above, there 
no longer will be confusion. 
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